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Markov equilibria in macroeconomics
Abstract
We review the recent literature in macroeconomics that analyses Markov equilibria in dynamic general
equilibrium model. After defining the Markov equilibrium concept we first summarize what is known
about the existence and uniqueness of such equilibria in models where sequential equilibria can be
obtained by solving a suitable social planner problem. We then discuss the existence problems of
Markov equilibria in models where equivalence of equilibrium allocations and solutions to social
planner problems cannot be established and review techniques the literature has developed to deal with
the existence problem, as well as recent applications of these techniques in macroeconomics.
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1 Introduction
We say that a dynamic economy has a Markovian structure (or is Markovian, for
short), if the stochastic processes that specify the fundamentals of the economy
(such as endowments, preferences and technologies) are Markov processes.1 In
many applications attention is restricted to …rst order Markov processes in which
the probability distributions over fundamentals today are functions exclusively
of their values yesterday.
In dynamic economies sequential equilibria are sequences of functions map-
ping histories of realizations of the stochastic process of the fundamentals into
allocations and prices such that all agents in the economy maximize their ob-
jectives, given prices, and all markets clear. Under fairly mild conditions (i.e.
convexity and continuity assumptions on the primitives) such equilibria exist.
However, in order to characterize and compute equilibria it is often useful to
look for equilibria of a di¤erent form.
Recursive Markov equilibria can be characterized by a state space, a policy-
function and a transition functions. The policy function maps the state today
into current endogenous choices and prices, and the transition function maps
the state today into a probability distribution over states tomorrow (see e.g.
the de…nition in Ljunqvist and Sargent’s (2000) textbook). In most of this sur-
vey we will use the terms ’Markov equilibria’ and ’recursive Markov equilibria’
interchangeably, however, below we will also consider Markov-equilibria which
are not recursive and will refer to these as generalized Markov equilibria. This
characterization leaves open of course what are the appropriate state variables
that constitute the state space.
Most simply, the state space would consist of the set of possible exogenous
shocks governing endowments, preferences and technologies. But other than
in exceptional cases (see, e.g. Lucas’ (1978) asset pricing application where
asset prices are solely functions of the underlying shocks to technology), such a
strongly stationary Markov equilibrium does not exist.
1 Deterministic economies are special cases in which the stochastic processes for the funda-
mentals have degenerate distributions.
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In addition to the exogenous shocks endogenous variables have to be included
in the state space to assure existence of a Markov equilibrium. We de…ne as
the minimal state space the space of all exogenous shocks and endogenous vari-
ables that are payo¤ relevant today, in that they a¤ect current production or
consumption sets or preferences (see Maskin and Tirole, 2001).
We call Markov equilibria with this minimal state space ’simple Markov
equilibria’. In the remainder of this essay we want to discuss what we know
about the existence and uniqueness of such Markov equilibria, both in general
and for important speci…c example. As it turns out, when equilibria are Pareto
e¢cient and thus equilibrium allocation can be determined by solving a suitable
social planner problem simple Markov equilibria can be shown to exist under
fairly mild conditions. We therefore discuss this case …rst. On the other hand,
when equilibria are not Pareto e¢cient, e.g. when markets are incomplete or
economic agents behave strategically, forward-looking variables often have to be
included for a Markov equilibrium to exist; therefore simple Markov equilibria
in the sense de…ned above do not exist in general. We discuss this case in section
3.
2 Markov Equilibria in Economies where Equi-
libria are Pareto Optimal
In this section we discuss the existence and uniqueness of simple Markov equi-
libria in economies whose sequential market equilibrium allocations can be de-
termined as solutions to a suitable social planner problem. In these economies
the problem of proving the existence of a Markov equilibrium reduces to show-
ing that the solution of the social planner can be written as a time-invariant
optimal policy function of the minimal set of state variables, as de…ned above.
This is commonly done by re-formulating the optimization problem of the
social planner as a functional equation and showing that the optimal Markov
policy function generates a sequential allocation which solves the original social
planner problem; this is what Bellman (1957) called the principle of optimality.
This principle can be established under weak conditions, see Stokey et al. (1989).
Equipped with this result the existence of a Markov equilibrium then follows
from the existence of a solution to the functional equation associated with the
social planner problem.
If the functional equation can be shown to be a contraction mapping (su¢-
cient conditions for this were provided by Blackwell, 1965), then it follows that
there exists a unique value function solving the functional equation and an opti-
mal policy correspondence. In addition, the contraction mapping theorem also
gives an iterative procedure to …nd the solution to the functional equation from
any starting guess, which is helpful for numerical work.
Under weaker conditions other …xed point theorems may be employed to
argue at least for the existence (if not uniqueness) of a solution to the functional
equation, with associated optimal Markov policy correspondence. In order to
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establish that the policy correspondence is actually a function (and thus the
Markov equilibrium is unique) in general strict concavity of the return function
needs to be assumed. Stokey et al. (1989) provide a summary of the main
results in the general theory of dynamic programming.
This technique of analyzing and computing dynamic equilibria in Pareto op-
timal economies is now widely used in macroeconomics. Its …rst application can
be found in Lucas and Prescott (1971) in their study of optimal investment be-
havior under uncertainty. Lucas (1978) used recursive techniques to study asset
prices in an endowment economy and showed that the Markov equilibrium has
a particularly simple from. Kydland and Prescott (1982) showed how powerful
these techniques are for a quantitative study of the business cycle implications
of the neoclassical growth model with technology shocks to production. The
volume by Cooley (1995) provides a comprehensive overview over this line of
research.
3 Generalized Markov Equilibria
In models where the …rst welfare theorem is not applicable (for example models
with incomplete …nancial markets or with distorting taxes), in models where
there are in…nitely many agents (e.g. OLG models) or in models with strategic
interaction existence of simple Markov equilibria (i.e. Markov equilibria with
minimal state space) cannot be guaranteed2 (see Santos (2002), Krebs (2004),
Kubler and Schmedders (2002) and Kubler and Polemarchakis (2004) for simple
counter-examples). The functional equations characterizing equilibrium have
no contraction properties and more general …xed-point theorems than the con-
traction mapping theorem, such as Schauder’s …xed point theorem cannot be
applied because it is di¢cult to guarantee compactness of the space of admissi-
ble functions. Coleman (1991) is an important example where existence can be
shown. However, his results rely on monotonicity conditions on the equilibrium
dynamics which are not satis…ed in general models.
In the applied literature a solution to this problem was suggested early on.
For example Kydland and Prescott (1980) analyze a Ramsey dynamic optimal
taxation problem. To make the problem recursive they add as a state variable
last period’s marginal utility.
On the theoretical side Du¢e et al. (1994) were the …rst to rigorously analyze
situations where recursive equilibria may fail to exist in general equilibrium
models. Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Miao and Santos (2005) re…ne
their approach and make it applicable for computations.3 We now present their
basic idea.
Consider a Markovian economy where a date-event (or node) can be asso-
ciated with a …nite history of shocks, st = (s0; : : : ;st). The shocks follow a
2 An important exception are Bewley-style models with incomplete markets where simple
recursive Markov equilibria exist, see e.g. Krebs (2005).
3 Miao and Santos (2005) also give a clear explanation of how this approach relates to the
work by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990).
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Markov chain with support S = f1; :::; Sg. Denote by z(st) the vector of all
endogenous variables at node st . Typically this would include the vector of
household asset holdings across individuals and the capital stock at the begin-
ning of the period, but also prices and endogenous choices at note st; as well as
shadow variables such as Lagrange multipliers. A competitive equilibrium is a
process of endogenous variables fz(st)g with z(st) 2 Z ½ RM , which solve the
optimization problems of all agents in the economy, and clear markets. The set
Z denotes the set of all possible values of the endogenous variables.
We focus on dynamic economic models where an equilibrium can be charac-
terized by a set of equations4 relating current-period exogenous and endogenous
variables to endogenous and exogenous variables next period. Examples of such
equations are the Euler equations of individual households, …rst order conditions
of …rms, as well as market-clearing conditions for all markets. We assume that
such a set of equations characterizing equilibrium is given and denote it by
h(s^; z^; z1; : : : ; zS) = 0:
The arguments (s^; z^) denote the exogenous state variables and endogenous vari-
ables for the current period. Note that the endogenous variables might contain
variables which were determined in the previous period, such as the capital
stock, individuals’ assets etc. The variables (zs)Ss=1 denote endogenous vari-
ables in the subsequent period, in states s = 1; : : : ; S, respectively. We refer to
h(¢) = 0 as the set of “equilibrium equations”.
As explained above, to analyze Markov equilibria, one needs to specify an
appropriate state space. We assume that the equilibrium set Z can be written
as the product Y £ Z^, where Y denotes the set into which the endogenous
state variables fall. In the neoclassical growth model, Y would consist of the
set of possible values of the capital stock, in models with heterogeneous agents
one would need to add the set of possible wealth distributions across agents.
Unfortunately, as the references cited above show a recursive Markov equilibrium
with this state space may not exist. We therefore require a more general notion
of Markov equilibrium for these types of economies.
A generalized Markov equilibrium consists of a (non-empty valued) “policy
correspondence”, P that maps the state today into possible endogenous vari-
ables today and a “transition function” F that maps the state and endogenous
variables today into endogenous variables next period. Formally, the maps
P : S £ Y ¶ Z^ and F : graph(P ) ! ZS
should satisfy that for all shocks and endogenous variables in the current period,
( s^; z^) 2 graph(P ), the transition function prescribes values next period that are
consistent with the equilibrium equations, i.e.
h(s^; z^; F (s^; z^)) = 0;
4 It is straightforward to incorporate inequality constraints into this framework. For expo-
sitional purposes we focus on equations.
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and lie in the policy correspondence, i.e.
(s; Fs(s^; z^)) 2 graph(P ) for all s 2 S :
It follows that a generalized Markov equilibrium is recursive according to our
earlier de…nition, if the associated policy correspondence is single valued. It is
simple if the state space is the natural minimal state space.
It is easy to see that Markov equilibria are in fact competitive equilibria in
the usual sense. Du¢e et al. (1994) show that under mild assumptions on the
primitives of the model generalized Markov equilibria exist whenever competi-
tive equilibria exist. The basic idea of their approach is very similar to backward
induction, using critically a natural monotonicity property of the inverse of the
equilibrium equations.5
For practical purposes it is of course crucial that the chosen state space is
relatively small and that the Markov equilibrium is recursive. In an asset pricing
model with heterogeneous agents, Kubler and Schmedders choose the state space
to consist of the beginning-of-period wealth distribution, but can only show the
existence of a generalized Markov equilibrium. One cannot rule out that the
equilibrium is not recursive, the same value of the state-variables might occur
with di¤erent values of the endogenous variables. The counter-examples to
existence mentioned above show that this is precisely the problem: If for given
initial conditions there exist multiple competitive equilibria the one that realizes
is pinned down by lagged variables. Without ruling out multiplicity of equilibria,
it does not seem possible to prove the existence of recursive equilibria with the
natural state space.
Miao and Santos (2005) enlarge the state space with the shadow values of
investment of all agents and prove that with this larger state space a recursive
Markov equilibrium exists. The basic insight of their approach is that one needs
to add variables to the natural state space that uniquely select one out of several
possible endogenous variables.
The main practical problem with the approach originated by Du¢e et al.
(1994) and re…ned by Miao and Santos (2005) is that it provides a method to
construct all Markov equilibria. There might exist some recursive equilibria for
the natural (minimal) state space, but this approach naturally solves for all
other recursive Markov equilibria as well.6
In many recent applications of recursive methods to macroeconomics the
focus of researchers studying nonoptimal economies is to …nd a recursive equi-
librium with minimal state space. Notable examples in which even this natural
state space is large are Rios-Rull (1996), Heaton and Lucas (1996) and Krusell
and Smith (1998). They mark the boundary of economies that currently can be
analyzed with recursive techniques.
In dynamic endowment economies with either informational frictions or lim-
ited enforceability of contracts constrained-e¢cient (e¢cient, subject to the in-
5 See their original paper, Kubler and Schmedders (2003) or Miao and Santos (2005) for
details.
6 Datta et al. (2005) provide ideas how to solve for the one Markov equilibrium with
minimal state space.
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formational or enforcement constraints) consumption allocations usually display
a high degree of dependence on past endowment shocks, even though the nat-
ural state space only contains the current endowment shock. Therefore Markov
equilibria with minimal state space do not exist. However, using ideas by Spear
and Srivastava (1987) and Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) the papers by
Atkeson and Lucas (1992) and Thomas and Worrall (1988) demonstrate that
nevertheless the constrained social planner problem has a convenient recursive
structure if one includes promised lifetime utility as a state variable into the
recursive problem. This approach or its close alternative, namely to introduce
as additional state variable Lagrange multiplies on the incentive or enforcement
constraints (as in Marcet and Marimon, 1999) has seen many applications in
macroeconomics, since it allows to make a large class of dynamic models with
informational of enforcement frictions recursive and hence tractable. Miao and
Santos (2005) show how such problems with strategic interactions can be incor-
porated into the framework above.
In optimal policy problems in which the government has no access to a
commitment technology a recent discussion about the desirability of a restriction
to Markov policies with minimal state space has emerged. Such restrictions
rule out reputation if one con…nes attention to smooth policies. See Phelan
and Stacchetti (2001) and Klein and Rios-Rull (2003) for examples of the two
opposing views on this issue. However, as Krusell and Smith (2003) argue if one
allows discontinuous policy functions reputation e¤ects can be generated even
with Markov policies.7
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